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Abstract
Human smuggling and terrorism are seen as two related activities because the
first is a potential source of funding for the last and it could facilitate the clandestine
transportation of terrorists. Accordingly, the White House has stated that terrorists
are among those who illegally enter from the Mexican border. Engaging a qualita-
tive methodology that included in-depth interviews conducted between 2011 and
2018 with 144 Mexican migrant smugglers, this chapter proceeds from the follow-
ing research question: Have Mexican migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists built
alliances in order for the latter to enter into the United States? This chapter con-
cludes that Mexican migrant smugglers have not built alliances with foreign terror-
ists. However, while migrant smugglers involved in simple networks were more
inclined to think that foreign terrorists could not be smuggled into the United
States, migrant smugglers involved in complex networks were more inclined to
think the opposite.
Keywords: terrorism, migrant smugglers, foreign terrorists, Mexico, US
Southwestern border
1. Introduction
Migrant smuggling has increasingly been framed as associated with transna-
tional terrorism [1, 2]. However, migrant smugglers and terrorists have opposite
motivations and goals, and migrant smuggling and terrorism are different phenom-
ena [2, 3]. Migrant smugglers are driven mainly by selfish motivations as they are
seeking for a material gain. On the contrary, terrorists are ideologically driven. The
latter aim to overhaul existing governance structures or influence public opinion
through criminal acts [2, 4]. The involvement of violent non-state actors, including
insurgent and terrorist groups, in drugs smuggling has been known for some time.
Many scholars have pointed out that the narcotic trade facilitates terrorism [5–10].
On the contrary, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the involvement of
migrant smugglers in terrorist activities. In places where human smuggling repre-
sents a significant portion of organized criminal activity, a link with terrorism is
suspected [11], but not proved. In some cases insurgent and terrorist groups have
driven drug cartels out of the market to supplant them themselves [12]. However,
nothing indicates that migrant smugglers have been supplanted neither by drug
traffickers [13–16] nor terrorist groups [3].
US authorities have been concerned about a possible collusion between Mexican
migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists from the mid-1950s [17]. The global threat
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of terrorism was acknowledged in the 1981 Executive Order 12333 [18], and in the
aftermath of 9/11 attacks, these concerns were further accentuated [18, 19]. The
thinking was that foreign terrorists seeking US entry through the Southwestern
border would require the highly specialized Mexican smugglers who uniquely
understood how to navigate the complexities of clandestine travel. In an effort to
reduce the threat of terrorist infiltration at the US Southwest border, the US Gov-
ernment has focused its attention on international smuggling networks transporting
special interest or other than Mexican aliens [7]. On December 16, 2002, President
Bush signed the National Security Directive 22, the connection between migrant
smuggling and terrorism being made explicit. Two years later, the Human Smug-
gling and Trafficking Center was established in order to facilitate the exchange of
information to support the investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers, and
in 2005, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act developed an
interagency task force to study the interrelationship between human trafficking
and terrorism, including the use of profits from the former to finance the latter
[3, 12, 20].
The United States has been insulated from international terrorism since 9/11,
and no migrant has committed an attack on US soil, to date [21]. Accordingly, some
studies suggest that more migration into a country is associated with a lower level of
terrorist attacks [22]. However, migration control for the control of terrorism is a
widely used instrument in the United States. The threat of terrorism provided a
pretext for a rigorous application of entry restrictions and deportations, the
enforcement of stricter migration controls being legitimized [23]. As Slack et al.
have pointed out: “the mission statement for CBP does not mention immigration at
all, but rather focuses explicitly on terrorism” [24]. Departing from the argument
that several terrorist attacks in the western part of continental Europe were perpe-
trated by immigrants who were smuggled and camouflaged among millions of
asylum seekers, every migrant or refugee has become a potential terrorist [4, 25]. If
foreign-based terrorists were successful in using migrant smuggling networks to
reach European targets, which also could reach the US Southwestern border in the
same manner. On the other hand, the migrant smuggling industry is seen as a
potential source of income for terrorist groups [1]. Consequently, building a wall
along the southern border in order to keep the country safe from terrorists and
illegal immigrants was a key promise of Trump’s presidential campaign. This prom-
ise has been repeated with conviction and consistency. On January 25, 2017, just
8 days since taking office, President Trump signed an executive order defining
illegal immigration as a “clear and present danger to the interests of the United
States.” Two days later, on January 27, a new executive order “Protecting the Nation
from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals” was issued, the entry of nationals of
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen being suspended [25]. Accord-
ingly, in order to prevent human smuggling and acts of terrorism, the construction
of a contiguous physical wall between Mexico and the United States was ordered.
This chapter is underpinned in the following research question: Have Mexican
migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists built alliances in order for the latter to
enter into the United States? On the other hand, this research centers on the
hypothesis that Mexican migrant smugglers involved in simple networks do not
help foreign terrorists to enter the US soil as they carry only labor migrants from
their hometown or region; on the contrary, those smugglers involved in complex
networks could inadvertently help terrorists to cross the border as they do not know
their clientele.
This chapter, based on interviews with 144 Mexican migrant smugglers, exam-
ines if Mexican migrant smugglers have built alliances with foreign terrorists. The
paper proceeds as follows: I first provide a description of the methodology. Next,
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the characteristics of simple networks and complex networks are analyzed. Finally,
I go on to examine the opinions of migrant smugglers involved in simple and
complex networks about the possibility of foreign terrorists being crossed through
the US Southwestern border with the help of Mexican migrant smugglers.
2. Methodology
This research is based on a qualitative methodology. Qualitative interviews were
conducted with a guide, all interviews being recorded and transcribed literally. On
the other hand, contact with interviewees was made via social networks and
snowballing in different Mexican states.
Fieldwork was conducted between 2011 and 2018, and 144 migrant smugglers
ranging from 21 to 48 years were interviewed. All had considerable experience in
the business of human smuggling. They started working as migrant smugglers
between the ages of 16 and 45 years and are dedicated to this activity for 9.5 years
on average. Respondents had 0–17 years of schooling, and the age at which they
started working ranges from 5 to 23 years (see Table 1).
More than two-thirds of the interviewees were born in Tamaulipas, a Mexican
state located in the northeast of the country. However, interviewees originated
from almost half of Mexico’s states. Only one of the interviewees was not born in
Mexico (see Table 2).
Average Mode Median Min Max Standard
deviation
Age 36.8 35 37 21 48 5.2
Years of schooling 5.7 6 6 0 17 3.5
Age when started working 10.1 10 10 5 23 3.33
Age when started working as migrant
smugglers
27.2 29 28 16 45 5.1
Number of years involved in human
smuggling
9.5 7 9 3 21 4.0
Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews. n = 144.
Table 1.
Characteristics of the interviewees.
n % n %
Tamaulipas 60 41.7 Tabasco 3 2.1
Veracruz 15 10.4 State of Mexico 2 1.4
Mexico City 13 9.0 Guanajuato 2 1.4
Nuevo León 13 9.0 Oaxaca 2 1.4
San Luis Potosí 12 8.3 Sonora 2 1.4
Chiapas 10 6.9 Chihuahua 1 0.7
Puebla 4 2.8 Guerrero 1 0.7
Coahuila 3 2.1 California (United States) 1 0.7
Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews. n = 144.
Table 2.
Place of origin of migrant smugglers interviewed.
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Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Tamaulipas
University research group on “Migration, development and human rights” [26].
Informed oral consent was obtained from the respondents, and participants were
provided with verbal information about the study purpose in simple language.
Interviewees were informed about the voluntary nature of their participation in the
study and were told that the information they shared was confidential. Participants
were assured that individual names would not be collected or used in any study
findings.
3. Simple networks and complex networks
Mexican migrant smuggling networks can be divided by their degree of com-
plexity. Those networks composed of one cell led by a migrant smuggler can be
defined as simple, while those consisting of one or more lines, with two or more
cells per line, can be defined as complex [27–29]. A cell is a structure lead by a
migrant smuggler supported by a small number of assistants, who transport
migrants from the point A to the point B. A line is the group of actors involved in
the transportation of a group of migrants from the point A in the country of origin
to the point B in the country of destination. In simple networks a unique cell trans-
ports migrants from the point of origin to the point of destination. In complex
networks usually a line is composed of several cells. Simple networks are composed
only of a line, while complex networks usually involve several lines.
Simple networks are composed of one cell led by a migrant smuggler, with the
support of a small number of assistants. Migrant smugglers involved in simple
networks are autonomous entrepreneurs who lead the network. Some of them
satisfy the labor demand of US employers and receive an economic compensation
from them; others tend to work primarily for migrant social networks.
Complex networks are composed of one or more lines; each line has several cells,
and each cell appears to be led by a migrant smuggler who has the support of several
assistants. Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks are salaried workers.
They lead the cell but not the network they are involved in. The one who leads the
network is a person that the smugglers call “patron.” Smugglers receive orders from
the “patron” who manages the network and receive a salary that is paid by their
patron [30].
4. Migrant smugglers in simple networks
Migrant smugglers involved in simple networks answered to the question if
foreign terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using the services
provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks, by using two lines of argumen-
tation to describe the possible links between smugglers and foreign terrorists:
• Less than half (46.2%) of the respondents thought that terrorists could enter
the United States by using established human smuggling networks.
• More than half (53.8%) of the respondents did not believe that terrorists could
be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling
networks (see Table 3).
Migrant smugglers involved in simple networks tend to believe that foreign
terrorists cannot be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided
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by Mexican migrant smuggling networks. Almost one-third (30%) answered that
they never witnessed the crossing of terrorist. Interviewees pointed out that they
had witnessed how labor migrants from many different countries had crossed the
US Southwestern border. Some of them also pointed out that drugs were being
smuggled through the border day in and day out, during day and night times.
However, during the many years they had been working as migrant smugglers, they
never witnessed Arab terrorists being smuggled to the United States. This was
reflected in expressions such as: “I haven’t seen Arabs; I have only seen Mexicans
and Central Americans” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2011);
“I haven’t seen any Arabs; I’ve seen Cubans, Central Americans, people from Brazil
or Belize; but I haven’t seen any Arabs” (migrant smuggler from Puebla
interviewed in 2012); “Here I didn’t see that. I’ve seen many immigrants crossing
the border; but they are Mexicans or they come from Central America” (migrant
smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2014); or “Terrorists don’t cross, the
only thing crossing are drugs, always, every day, and at every hour of the day”
(migrant smuggler from Coahuila interviewed in 2015). On the other hand, less
than one-sixth (15%) indicated that they thought terrorist were not crossing
through the Mexico-US border; but, they pointed out that they did not have an
extensive knowledge of the border. Therefore, they indicated that their opinion was
not very relevant.
Argument n %
Terrorists could enter the United States by using
established migrant smuggling networks
If illegal immigrants can cross the border
also can terrorists.
28 35
If weapons and drugs are smuggled into
the United States, also terrorists can be
smuggled.
2 2.5
Migrant smugglers are unaware of the
intentions of their clients.
5 6.2
Terrorists can enter the United States
because of corruption.
2 2.5
Total 37 46.2
Terrorists could not be smuggled into the
United States by using Mexican migrant
smuggling networks
They had never witnessed the crossing of
terrorists.
24 30
They did not have an extensive
knowledge of the border.
12 15
The US Government blames Mexico for
all of their problems.
2 2.5
Terrorists cannot cross through territories
controlled by the drug cartels.
1 1.3
Terrorists can enter the United States
through its airports.
3 3.7
Terrorists can cross through the customs
situated at the southwestern border.
1 1.3
Total 43 53.8
Total 80 100
Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews.
Table 3.
Arguments expressed by migrant smugglers involved in simple networks.
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5. Migrant smugglers in complex networks
Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks answered to the question if
foreign terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using the services
provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks, by using two lines of argumen-
tation to describe the possible links between smugglers and foreign terrorists:
• More than half (56.3%) of the respondents thought that terrorists could enter
the United States by using established human smuggling networks.
• Less than half (43.7%) of the respondents did not believe that terrorists could
be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling
networks (Table 4).
Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks tend to believe that foreign
terrorists can be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided by
Mexican migrant smuggling networks. More than one-third (37.5%) thought that if
illegal immigrants could cross the border also could terrorists. Interviewees pointed
out that they were helping anybody to cross the US Southwestern border who paid a
fee. Respondents had helped people from many different countries to cross the
border. Therefore, they could not know if some of these people were terrorists or
not. Respondents had the impression that the US Southwestern border was not an
orderly inspected place; on the contrary, they used to think that the border was a
place poorly protected where migrants, drugs, and so on were crossing over at every
moment [30]. The expression “so many things happen at the border” were repeated
Argument n %
Terrorists could enter the United States by using
established migrant smuggling networks
If illegal immigrants can cross the border also can
terrorists.
24 37.5
If weapons and drugs are smuggled into the
United States, also terrorists can be smuggled.
5 7.8
Migrant smugglers are unaware of the intentions
of their clients.
6 9.4
Terrorists can enter the United States because of
corruption.
1 1.6
Total 36 56.3
Terrorists could not be smuggled into the United States
by using Mexican migrant smuggling networks
They had never witnessed the crossing of
terrorists.
8 12.5
They did not have an extensive knowledge of the
border.
4 6.2
The US Government blames Mexico for all of
their problems.
1 1.6
Terrorists can’t cross through territories
controlled by the drug cartels.
4 6.2
Terrorists can enter the United States through its
airports.
9 14.1
Terrorists can cross through the customs situated
at the southwestern border.
2 3.1
Total 28 43.7
Total 64 100
Source: Compiled by the authors from data recorded in the interviews.
Table 4.
Arguments expressed by migrant smugglers involved in complex networks.
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by many interviewees indicating that anything could occur at the border. This was
reflected in expressions such as: “It could be possible, because many things happen
from here to there, from there to here also happen” (migrant smuggler fromMexico
City interviewed in 2012); “Probably they could cross; many people are going to the
north, people that we don’t know, they are not from here, they are not Central
Americans” (migrant smuggler from Veracruz interviewed in 2013); “It could hap-
pen; so many illegals cross through Mexico that sometimes you don’t know where
they are coming from” (migrant smuggler from Sonora interviewed in 2014); “So
many things happen at the border, that terrorist could cross the frontier and nobody
would notice” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2014); “There is
so much smuggling that everything can be true. It could be possible that Mexico is
used by terrorists to cross to the United States” (migrant smuggler from Coahuila
interviewed in 2015); “I think that it is possible because Mexico is the US entrance;
from Mexico many things cross: drugs, illegals and more” (migrant smuggler from
Mexico City interviewed in 2018); or “It is possible that they could cross; it is said
that there is so much vigilance, it is not true. I didn’t see them, but there is so much
free passage to the US” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2018).
Moreover, almost 1 in 10 (7.8%) thought that if weapons and drugs were smuggled
into the United States, also terrorists could be smuggled (Table 4).
6. Conclusion
Migrant smugglers interviewed had never witnessed terrorists to cross the bor-
der by using the services provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks. How-
ever, there was a difference between the answers responded by migrant smugglers
involved in simple networks and those involved in complex networks. The former
were more inclined to express arguments denying the existence of connections
between foreign terrorists and Mexican migrant smugglers, while the latter were
more predisposed to think that foreign terrorist could enter the United States by
using the same channels employed by migrant smugglers to smuggle labor migrants
or by drug traffickers to smuggle weapons or drugs. We conclude that migrant
smugglers involved in simple networks are more inclined to think that foreign
terrorist cannot be smuggled to the United States because they come from the same
hometown or region of their clientele and gained their knowledge of entering the
United States illegally from their own experiences as migrants. Therefore, they
personally know that their customers are not terrorists. On the contrary, migrant
smugglers involved in complex networks do not come from the same hometown or
region of their clientele. Their customers come from different countries; and they
do not know personally any of them. Therefore, they could not be completely sure if
any of them was a terrorist.
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Case Age Education Origin Destination Experience as human smuggler Profile of migrants Type of
network
Argument
Years Initiation Crossings/
year
People/
crossing
Age Women >50 <12
1 39 7 Tamaulipas Virginia 4 2007 2 13/18 25–45 No No No Simple 1.3
2 38 9 Tamaulipas Texas 11 2000 1 10/15 20–50 Yes Yes No Simple 1.3
3 45 5 Tamaulipas Idaho 21 1990 0/1 8/10 16–40 No No No Simple 1.1
4 35 1 Tamaulipas Texas 6 2005 2/3 6/12 20–35 No No No Simple 1.2
5 39 6 Veracruz Florida 10 2001 2 20/25 20–40 No No No Simple 2.4
6 40 9 Tamaulipas Texas 11 2000 6 13 16–30 Yes No No Complex 3.1
7 44 9 Chiapas Virginia 4 2007 6 8/12 10–45 Yes No Yes Complex 2.2
8 33 6 Tamaulipas North Carolina 7 2004 2/3 12/18 20–40 Yes No No Simple 1.1
9 46 6 Tamaulipas Texas 5 2006 4/6 10/20 16–40 No No No Simple 2.2
10 39 4 Tamaulipas North Carolina 8 2003 2 10/15 Yes No No Simple 1.1
11 45 6 Mexico City Oregon 5 2006 2 15/20 15–35 No No No Simple 1.1
12 43 9 Tamaulipas Texas, Canada 14 1997 1 9/20 12–55 Yes Yes Yes Simple 2.1
13 40 6 Nuevo León Texas, California 5 2006 2 10/20 Yes Yes Yes Simple 3.1
14 28 12 Nuevo León Arizona 4 2007 12 6/10 16–35 Yes No No Complex 2.2
15 21 9 Tamaulipas South Carolina 4 2007 1 8/10 15–40 No No No Simple 2.2
16 37 6 San Luis Potosí California 16 1995 1 5/15 20–50 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
17 39 6 San Luis Potosí Colorado 5 2006 1 10/15 18–50 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
18 37 6 San Luis Potosí Texas 7 2004 2 17/20 15–55 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
Appendices
Appendix 1: Information about the interviewees
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Case Age Education Origin Destination Experience as human smuggler Profile of migrants Type of
network
Argument
Years Initiation Crossings/
year
People/
crossing
Age Women >50 <12
19 30 6 San Luis Potosí Arizona 6 2005 1 15/25 18–30 Yes No No Simple 2.1
20 25 9 Nuevo León Texas 5 2006 12 7/12 1–60 Yes Yes Yes Simple 2.1
21 39 0 Chiapas Alabama 10 2001 2 8/15 12–60 Yes Yes Yes Simple 2.1
22 30 9 Tamaulipas Texas 4 2007 1 10/15 15–40 No No No Simple 1.1
23 29 6 Tamaulipas South Carolina 6 2005 1 10/20 16–50 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
24 45 9 San Luis Potosí Florida 11 2000 1 7/15 13–50 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
25 32 6 Tamaulipas North Carolina 8 2003 1 10/20 20–40 Yes No No Simple 2.1
26 40 4 Tamaulipas Texas 16 1995 1 7/9 14–40 Yes No No Simple 3.2
27 36 9 Chiapas Texas 5 2006 3/5 3/20 > 5 Yes Yes Yes Complex 3.2
28 38 9 Tamaulipas Texas 7 2004 12 10/40 Yes Yes Yes Complex 2.3
29 35 6 Nuevo León Texas 6 2006 8/10 6 20–40 No No No Complex 2.3
30 41 6 Coahuila Texas 7 2005 1 10/15 10–40 Yes No Yes Simple 1.1
31 25 9 Nuevo León Texas 6 2006 4 7/9 20–40 No No No Simple 2.3
32 45 4 Tamaulipas Texas 17 1995 2 10 20–50 No Yes No Simple 2.1
33 41 8 Tamaulipas Texas 11 2001 1 20/25 15–40 No No No Simple 2.1
34 33 6 Tamaulipas Texas 10 2002 2 7/15 20–35 No No No Simple 1.1
35 39 6 Nuevo León Texas 12 2000 1 8/15 20–40 Yes No No Simple 2.3
36 45 4 San Luis Potosí Oklahoma 20 1992 1 7/15 15–35 No No No Simple 2.3
37 37 6 Nuevo León Texas 11 2001 2 4/8 18–50 No Yes No Simple 2.1
38 35 9 Tamaulipas Texas 15 1997 1/2 5/10 20–40 No No No Simple 2.1
39 41 9 Tamaulipas Louisiana 11 2001 1 4/12 18–35 No No No Simple 2.1
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Case Age Education Origin Destination Experience as human smuggler Profile of migrants Type of
network
Argument
Years Initiation Crossings/
year
People/
crossing
Age Women >50 <12
40 48 9 Tamaulipas Florida 14 1998 1 7/10 15–50 Yes Yes No Simple 1.1
41 35 6 Tamaulipas Louisiana 11 2001 1/2 4/10 20–40 No No No Simple 2.1
42 30 9 Tamaulipas Texas 4 2008 1 4/9 20–35 No No No Simple 2.1
43 32 6 Tamaulipas Texas 12 2000 1/2 5/9 35–40 No No No Simple 1.1
44 35 9 Nuevo León Texas 7 2005 6/12 5/15 18–40 Yes No No Simple 2.1
45 40 6 Tamaulipas Texas 12 2000 7/11 5/15 20–30 Yes No No Simple 1.1
46 40 9 Tamaulipas Virginia 17 1995 2 8/15 15–50 Yes Yes No Simple 1.2
47 37 5 Tamaulipas Florida 10 2002 2 6/10 15–40 Yes No No Simple 1.2
48 45 9 Tamaulipas Louisiana 12 2000 3 10/20 15–35 Yes No No Simple 1.1
49 39 2 Tamaulipas Louisiana 10 2002 10/20 18–40 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
50 28 6 Tamaulipas Texas 8 2004 12/15 10/15 15–35 Yes No No Complex 1.1
51 41 6 Tamaulipas Texas 10 2002 2 7/10 15–45 Yes No No Simple 2.1
52 38 9 Tamaulipas Florida 8 2004 3 10 13–35 Yes No No Simple 1.2
53 36 6 Tamaulipas Texas 6 2006 6 16–40 No No No Simple 2.1
54 30 12 Tamaulipas Illinois 5 2007 6 7/10 20–35 Yes Yes No Simple 2.1
55 40 4 Tamaulipas Virginia 10 2002 2 7/10 18–40 Yes No No Simple 1.1
56 43 8 Tamaulipas Texas 15 1997 2 10/20 Yes Yes Yes Simple 1.1
57 39 6 Mexico City Florida 10 2002 25 20–40 No No No Simple 2.1
58 35 3 Tamaulipas Arizona 10 2002 3 7/15 20–40 No No No Simple 2.3
59 45 6 Tamaulipas North Carolina 9 2003 3/4 12/30 20–50 No Yes No Simple 1.1
60 40 6 Tamaulipas Texas 8 2004 2 7/10 15–35 No No No Simple 2.1
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Case Age Education Origin Destination Experience as human smuggler Profile of migrants Type of
network
Argument
Years Initiation Crossings/
year
People/
crossing
Age Women >50 <12
61 34 6 Guanajuato Texas, North Carolina, Virginia 8 2004 9/15 15/20 15–60 Yes Yes No Complex 1.4
62 45 6 Tamaulipas Texas 10 2002 1/2 8/30 13–50 Yes Yes No Simple 1.1
63 36 9 Mexico City Texas, New Mexico, New
Orleans, Florida, Virginia,
California
4 2008 12/15 15/20 Yes Yes Yes Complex 2.1
64 37 6 Mexico City Texas 5 2007 24 20/25 16–40 Yes No Yes Complex 2.1
65 35 5 Mexico City Texas 15 1997 12/24 5/10 5–40 Yes No Yes Complex 3.1
66 32 0 Puebla California 7 2005 12 8 13–45 Yes No No Complex 1.1
67 40 9 Mexico city Texas 12 2000 9/12 7/20 15–40 Yes Yes No Complex 1.1
68 38 6 San Luis Potosí Texas 9 2003 3 7/15 15–30 Yes No No Simple 2.1
69 36 6 San Luis Potosí Illinois 11 2001 4 7/20 15–40 Yes No No Simple 1.2
70 42 9 Tamaulipas Texas 9 2003 2 7 18–25 Yes No No Simple 1.2
71 32 9 Veracruz Texas 6 2002 12/24 15/20 14–40 Yes No No Complex 1.2
72 35 3 Puebla Texas 7 2005 4 10 15–30 Yes No No Simple 1.1
73 41 12 San Luis Potosí Texas 6 2006 12 11 3–40 Yes Yes Yes Complex 2.1
74 37 3 Tamaulipas Texas 8 2004 2 7 17–30 Yes No No Simple 1.2
75 36 3 San Luis Potosí Texas 9 2004 4 7/10 15–30 only No No Complex 2.1
76 40 3 Coatzacoalcos
Veracruz
Texas, Florida, North Carolina,
South Carolina
16 1997 6 10/12 13–50 Yes Yes No Complex 3.1
77 35 4 Mexico City Texas 16 1997 24/36 5/8 13–35 Yes No No Complex 1.1
78 37 6 Mexico City Florida 8 2005 6/24 6/10 15–30 Yes No No Complex 3.1
79 32 0 Mexico City Texas 9 2004 3/4 6/8 17–40 Yes No No Simple 3.1
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Case Age Education Origin Destination Experience as human smuggler Profile of migrants Type of
network
Argument
Years Initiation Crossings/
year
People/
crossing
Age Women >50 <12
80 28 6 State of Mexico California 10 2003 3/4 10 20–27 Yes No No Complex 2.1
81 23 6 Mexico City Texas 7 2006 6 9/15 18–30 Yes No No Complex 2.1
82 35 0 Mexico City Texas 8 2005 6/12 8/10 20–40 Yes No No Complex 2.1
83 40 9 Mexico City Texas 16 1997 3/4 15/20 15–40 No No No Complex 1.2
84 36 0 Tamaulipas Oklahoma 9 2004 4 10 18–35 Yes No No Complex 2.2
85 38 0 Chiapas Texas 8 2005 3/4 10 15–30 No No No Simple 3.1
86 27 6 Veracruz Texas 7 2006 3/6 10 18–40 No No No Complex 2.1
87 42 6 Chiapas Oregon 20 1993 6 8/12 21–35 No No No Complex 2.1
88 37 6 Chiapas Texas, Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Florida
15 1998 4/6 12 20–40 Yes No No Complex 2.3
89 30 0 Chiapas California 7 2006 4 12/15 20–25 Yes No No Complex 2.1
90 32 9 Chihuahua Texas, New Mexico, California 10 1997 4/12 12 18–25 Yes No No Complex 3.1
91 35 0 Chiapas Virginia 7 2006 6/12 15 20–40 No No No Complex 1.2
92 31 0 Veracruz Texas 11 2002 4/6 15/20 15–35 Yes No No Simple 1.1
93 37 4 Veracruz Texas 7 2006 4/12 10 20–40 Yes Yes No Complex 2.1
94 40 0 Tamaulipas Texas 12 2001 4 13/15 16–30 Yes Yes No Complex 2.1
95 25 0 Veracruz Texas, Florida 6 2007 6 8/10 < 40 No No No Complex 2.2
96 38 0 Guerrero Texas 9 2004 12 8/10 14–35 Yes No No Complex 2.1
97 36 6 Veracruz Texas 13 2000 5 10/12 20–40 Yes No No Simple 2.1
98 41 4 Veracruz California 8 2005 6 10 18–35 Yes No No Complex 3.1
99 33 0 Veracruz Arizona 12 2001 9/12 20/25 Yes No Yes Complex 3.2
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100 25 0 Puebla Texas 7 2006 4 10/11 10–40 Yes Yes Yes Complex 2.1
101 35 9 Veracruz Texas 15 1998 4/6 15 16–25 Yes No No Complex 2.2
102 42 6 Veracruz Texas, California, Louisiana 9 2004 6 15 18–32 Yes No No Complex 1.2
103 42 6 San Luis Potosí Louisiana 9 2004 6/12 10 16–40 Yes No No Simple 2.1
104 28 8 Tamaulipas Texas 5 2008 8/10 7/8 16–25 Yes No No Complex 2.1
105 35 0 Puebla Texas 13 2000 8/10 8/10 Yes Yes Yes Simple 1.1
106 29 6 Nuevo León Florida 4 2009 12 8/12 Yes No No Complex 3.1
107 36 5 Tamaulipas Missouri 7 2006 6/7 15 16–35 Yes No No Complex 1.1
108 39 0 Tamaulipas Texas 11 2002 8/12 10/15 20–40 Yes No No Simple 1.2
109 37 0 Tamaulipas Texas 6 2007 12 10/15 16–35 Yes No No Complex 1.3
110 37 17 Tamaulipas Oklahoma 7 2006 4 13 20–40 No No No Simple 1.2
111 40 9 Tamaulipas Iowa 5 2009 3 12 17–35 No No No Simple 1.1
112 34 2 Tamaulipas Texas 4 2010 2 72 20–35 No No No Simple 1.1
113 39 5 Tamaulipas Texas 10 2004 2 9/10 No No No Simple 1.4
114 45 5 Tabasco Texas 17 1987 4 10 16–25 Yes No No Complex 2.1
115 39 9 State of Mexico California 8 2006 2 8/10 15–27 Yes No No Simple 2.4
116 32 6 Sonora Texas, Florida, California, New
York, Louisiana, Colorado
12 1995 6/12 7 14–20 Yes No No Complex 2.1
117 45 0 Veracruz Texas 15 1999 4/5 10/12 15–25 Yes No No Complex 2.4
118 38 6 Chiapas California 17 1997 4/5 5/7 16–23 Yes No No Complex 2.1
119 35 0 Veracruz Texas 6 2008 4/6 10/12 14–20 Yes No No Complex 2.1
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120 39 5 Tamaulipas South Carolina 6 2008 1 8/10 13–20 Yes No No Simple 1.2
121 30 12 Tamaulipas Texas 5 2009 1 10 14–22 Yes No No Complex 2.1
122 35 0 Tamaulipas Texas 10 2004 2 8/12 16–20 Yes No No Simple 2.1
123 41 3 San Luis Potosí Missouri 9 2005 2 12 16–22 Yes No No Simple 1.1
124 36 0 Tamaulipas Texas 12 1991 2/3 8/10 15–20 Yes No No Complex 1.4
125 40 9 Coahuila Texas 20 1995 3 12/15 Yes No Yes Simple 1.1
126 42 6 Sonora Arizona, Canada 18 1997 2 10 17–35 No No No Complex 1.1
127 33 4 Nuevo León Texas, Canada 8 2007 3 10 16–24 Yes No No Complex 1.4
128 42 0 Chiapas Texas 15 2000 2 10 16–30 Yes No No Simple 1.2
129 39 8 Tabasco California 16 1999 3/5 8/12 15–45 Yes No No Complex 3.1
130 35 6 Tamaulipas South Carolina 8 2007 2/3 14/20 16–30 No No No Complex 1.1
131 36 8 Coahuila Texas 5 2010 3 15/20 15–22 Yes No No Complex 2.1
132 41 0 Oaxaca Florida 15 2000 4 12/15 15–20 Yes No No Simple 1.1
133 38 9 Nuevo León Texas 5 2010 3 10 < 20 Yes No Yes Complex 2.1
134 35 9 Guanajuato Texas 8 2008 2/3 12/15 14–35 Yes No Yes Complex 1.4
135 43 4 Tamaulipas Texas 9 2007 2 15 17–30 Yes No No Simple 2.3
136 42 6 Veracruz Texas 10 2006 3/4 8/10 14–40 Yes No No Simple 1.2
137 38 9 Tabasco Texas 6 2010 3 10 16–24 No No No Simple 1.1
138 39 0 Tamaulipas Texas 12 2005 2 8 17–25 No No No Complex 2.3
139 36 6 Oaxaca Texas, Georgia 7 2010 2/3 10/11 16–40 Yes No No Complex 1.1
140 40 12 Nuevo León Texas 12 2005 2/3 10/13 16–30 Yes No No Complex 2.3
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141 39 6 California California 9 2008 3/4 10/13 14–30 Yes Yes No Complex 2.3
142 24 9 Nuevo Leon Texas 3 2015 2 10 < 20 Yes No No Complex 3.1
143 40 6 Mexico City Texas 11 2007 ¾ 8/10 16–25 No No No Complex 2.1
144 32 16 Tamaulipas Texas 8 2010 3 8/10 16–25 No No No Complex 2.1
Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews.
Education: Years of education of the interviewee.
Origin: Place where the interviewee originates from.
Destination: Place in the United States where the migrants are transported by human smuggling networks.
Experience as a migrant smuggler: Years: years of experience as a human smuggler.
Initiation: Year when interviewees began to work as human smugglers; Crossings/year: Number of times that the interviewee crosses the border each year; People/crossing: Number of migrants transported
at every crossing.
Profile of migrants: Age: age of the migrants transported by the interviewee; Women: Transport women; > 50: Transport people 50 years old and older; < 12: Transport children of less than 12 years old.
Argument:
1.1. They had never witnessed the crossing of terrorists.
1.2. They didn’t have an extensive knowledge of the border.
1.3. The US Government blames Mexico for all of their problems.
1.4. Terrorists can’t cross through territories controlled by the drug cartels.
2.1. If illegal immigrants can pass also can terrorists.
2.2. If weapons and drugs are smuggled also terrorists can be smuggled.
2.3. Human smugglers are unaware of the intentions of their clients.
2.4. Terrorists can enter the United States because of corruption.
3.1. Terrorists cross by airports.
3.2. Terrorists pass through the border customs.
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